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Political Theatre and Political Myths:
Robert Kennedy, George Wallace and
the Show Down at Tuscaloosa
Christina Lynch
By 11 :00 AM on June 11, 1963 a political performance that would define two men's careers awaited
only the principals' arrival. Everything stood ready,
from the cameras and lighting to the marks on the
floor where the lead ac tor would sland. A national
television audience waited expectantly for the show to
begin. 1 Alabama Governor George C. Wallace, a
notorious defender of segregation, had cast himself as
the martyr and star of the show. Hungry for public
recognition, Wallace prepared lo give the performance
of his life. 2 The "good guy" in this political drama,
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, had sent his
trusted ally, Assistant Attorney General Nicholas
Katzenbach, to handle this final ballle over desegregation of the University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa. 3
Wallace intended to keep his promise lo the while
citizens of Alabama Lo stand in the door Lo Lhe uuiversity's administration building to block two African
American students, Jimmy Hood and Vivian Malone,
from enrolling in the while university. With the sun
high in the sky, 200 journalists from various media
1
Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Robert Ke1tnedy and His Times
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1978), 341.
2
Peter N. Carroll. Famous in America: The Passion to
Succeed: Ja1te Fonda, George Wallace, Phyllis Schlafy, John
Glenn (New York: E. P. Dullon, 1985), 25 .
3
Schlesinger, 341.
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outlets present, and the nation watching, Wallace had
his moment in the spotlight. Wallace raised both
hands to prevent Katzenbach from entering the auditorium to register the two students. Katzenbach returned a few hours later for a second attempt. 4
The plol thickens, however. Kennedy and
Katzenbach were aware that Wallace, recognizing the
inevitable outcome of this mock battle, had sent word
to Katzenbach that on the second attempt, he would
step aside after saying a few words. The two black
students could then enter the university and enroll.
Wallace stuck to the script. 5 This carefully crafted
dimension of the day's events escaped the rest of the
nation, but achieved its goal. Both sides had appealed
successfully to their respective publics, and both won
praise for their performance. Though Katzenbach had
gone toe to toe with Wallace on that particular day, the
legacy of this political drama belonged to Kennedy.
Acknowledged as the voice for his brother's administration on the issue of civil rights, Robert Kennedy
emerged from the event as a hero of the Civil Rights
Movement, all the more so in the minds of many
because of his ability to reach his objectives without
using force. 6 Wallace also shaped his reputation
among southerners through his handling of this
moment; standing in the door cemented his status as
the last great southern defende r of segregation .7 It is
these legacies-Kennedy as a champion for civil rights
• Ibid., 337.
s Ibid.
6
John Lewis with Mi chael D'Orso, Walking with the Wind: A
Memoir of the Movement (San Diego: Harcourt Brace and
Company, 1998), 413.
' Ibid .
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and Wallace as a hold-out for the segregationist
south-that many Americans associate wilh the two
men to this day.
Historian Dan Carter argues that Robert Kennedy's
handling of the "s land in the schoolhouse door"
shuwed the American people the Kennedys at their
best. 8 Other historiar1s, including Robert Coles, Fawn
M. Brodie and Arthur Schlesinger, have popularized
this image of Robert Kennedy. Coles judges Kennedy
an effective moral leader who tried "lo do some good in
the world and prompt others to follow. "9 Brodie Lakes
her admiration a step further, placing Kennedy alongside Martin Luther King Jr., Mahatma Gandhi and
Abraham Lincoln . 10 Schlesinger, a friend of Kennedy,
asserts that Kennedy reacted more "directly" and
"sensitively" to the issues than any other political
leader of that era, making him the embodiment of the
American moral conscience. 11 Not all Kennedy historians agree with this image. Victor Navasky contends
8

Dan T. Carter, The Politics of Rage: George Wallace, the
Origins of the New Conservatism, and the Transformation of
American Politics (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 155. A
according to Carter, the incident exemplified their careful
operational planning and close attention to detail, while John
Kennedy's speech on national television that evening turne<l civil
rights into a moral issue for the nation. Robert Kennedy had
proven himself an effective advocate for equality who did nol
need to resort to force or violence to accomplish his objectives,
turning Wallace in the eyes of lhe nation into somewhat of a
"pathetic footnote" in history .
9
Robert Coles, Lives of Moral Leadership (New York: Random
House, 2000), 39.
1
° Fawn M. Bru<lie, "The Political Hero in America: His Fale
and His Future," The Virgillia Quarterly Review 46, no. J ( 1970) :
46-4 7.
'' Schlesinger, xi .
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that Kennedy's most significant civil rights activities
were responsive, he notes, and not proactive. Moreover, Kennedy did not make civil rights a legis lative
priority because he believed he could reason even with
men like George Wallace. 12 Donald Jackson and
James Riddlesperger agree, con tending that after John
Kennedy's assassination, his friends gave both broth ers an undeserved reputation on civil rights . All three
historians refute the argument that a strong moral
conviction drove the brothers' support for civil rights. 13
The extent to which George Wallace lived up to his
historical reputation is also debated. Dan Carter writes
that the governor's political intelligence allowed him to
become the "defender" of southern racism while
escaping the racist "stench" attached to other Southern governors like Mississippi's Ross Barnett. The
Tuscaloosa stand-off contributed to this effect. 14 In a
1965 interview, Martin Luther King Jr. articulated a
view now popular among historians: "I am not sure
12

Victor S. Navasky, Kennedy Justice (New York:
Antheneum, 1977), 98.
13
Donald W. Jackson and James W. Riddlesperger Jr.,
"John F. Kennedy and the Politics of Civi l Rights," in Presidential
Leadership and Civil Rights Policy, eds. Donald W. Jackson and
James W. Riddlesperger Jr. (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1995),
95.
14
Dan T. Carter, "From Foster Auditorium to Sanders
Auditorium: The Southernization of American Politics," in

Opening Doors: Perspectives on Race Relations in Contemporary
America, eds. Robert J. Norrell and Ronald W. Rogers
(Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1991), 68. Carter
stresses that Wallace raised the threat of violence only indirectly
so as to keep both John and Robert Kennedy "off balance and on
the defensive" and to make his own pos ition forceful and elu sive
at the same time .
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that [Wallace] believes all the poison he preaches, but
he is artful enough lo convince others." 15 Indeed,
playing into the public's emolions was a Lalent George
Wallace, who desperalely wanted to be admired, had
perfected. 16 Historians comment on Wallace's skillful
use of national media iu appealing Lo Lhe people of
Alabama; historian Marshall Frady calls the stand in
the school house door Wallace's "finest hour." The
theatrical nature of the confrontation was part of a
calculated plan to craft his historic legacy, Frady
asserts. Alabamans recognized that Wallace's confrontation would fail but "[w]hat matter[ed] [was] that he
fought and continue[d] to fight." 17 Southerners, he
notes, tend to love their heroes for defending a lost
cause. 18
If Wallace did not enlirely believe the "venom" that
he preached and Kennedy did not act because of a
strong moral conviction, why then did both men
emerge from this event wilh reputations that defy this
reality? Many historians acknowledge that Wallace's
legacy exists largely because he consciously crafted his
public image to make himself a star in white Southern
history. 19 Judgments of Kennedy differ so greally,
15
Martin Lulher King Jr., "Playboy lnlerview: Martin Luther
King Jr.," interview by Playboy Magazine, in A Testament of
Hope: the Essential Writings and Speeches of Marin Luther King
Jr., ed. James M. Washington (San Francisco: Harper, 1986),
373.
16
Carter, "From Foster Auditorium," 64.
17
Marshall Frady, Wallace (New York: The World Publishing
Company, 1968), 149.
18
Ibid., 171.
19
Dan T. Carler, From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race
in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963-1994 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana Slale Universily Press, 1996) 4-5.
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however, that his moral intentions are difficult to
assess. An exploration of the staging of the desegregation of the University of Alabama reveals that both
men used the public nature of the situation to craft
their reputations. The way in which the legacies of the
two men were put to use overlaps; the sanctification of
Kennedy kept Wallace cast as the villain in history long
after the university was successfully desegregated.
Wallace needed to appear the villain for Kennedy to
emerge the hero.
Wallace before Tuscaloosa
The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, had a
history with respect to desegregation long before
Wallace and Kennedy collided in June, 1963. The U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Brown vs. the Board of
Education of Topeka, Kansas in May, 1954 led to a
court order the following year to desegregate the
university. 20 On February 1, 1956, African-American
student Autherine Lucy enrolled and attended classes
for five days. With each passing day, resistance intensified until violence finally broke out. 21 The Board of
Trustees voted to expel Lucy on the grounds that she
had incited a riot. 22 ln 1963 the NAACP renewed its
fight for desegregation by supporting Vivian Malone
and James Hood in their application process. The
20
E. Culpepper Clark, "The Schoolhouse Door: An
Institutional Response to Desegregalion," in Opening Doors
Perspectives on Race Relations in Contemporary America, eels.
Harry J. Knapke, Robert J. Norre ll and Ronald W. Rogers
(Tuscaloosa: The Universily of Alabama Press, 1991 ), 40.
21
Ibid. , 43.
22
Clark, "The Schoolhouse D001-: An lnstilutional Response
lo Desegregation," 52.
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NAACP had good reason to try again; by 1963 Alabama
was the only state tha t h a d not desegregated higher
education .23
During his early political career, George Wallace
had not been segregation's most visible defender. In
fact, before his inaugural address in January 1963,
few Americans outside Alabama had even heard of
him. 24 In 1958, Wallace had run a populist campaign
for governor, promisin g better roads, better education
and increased industrial opportunities for
Alabamans. 25 About segregation he simply sta ted:
"[w]e shall continue to m aintain s egregation in Alabama completely and absolutely" but "without violence ." Violence, he argued, would only compound the
state's problems, and Wallace claimed to "advocate
[the] hatred of no man ." In a time when Southerners
feared social cha os, Wallace attempted a prac tical
approach and the preservation of segregation was far
from practical. 26 Though he did promise that "neither
my children, nor your children, will go to mixed
schools," his demeanor and emphasis ironically made
him the candidate of choice for the NAACP and the
Jewish population in Alabama. For white southerners
who felt that Brown threatened their way of life,
however, Wallace failed the test. 27 The far more
conservative John Patterson, pledging not to follow
23

Ibid., 60 .
Dan T. Ca rte r, "Legacy of Rage: George Wal lace a nd the
Tra nsforma tion of American Politics," The J ournal of Southe rn
History 62 , no . l (1 9 96): G.
25
Da n T. Carte r, "Fact, Fic tion a nd Film : Franke nheimer 's
George Wallace ," Pe rsp ectives (J a nua ry 1998): l.
26
Ca rroll., 2 6.
27
Ca rroll, 3 6 .
24
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federal laws like desegregation that he deemed "foreign," won the election. 28 Crushed by his defeat,
Wallace learned that moderation and practicality got a
politician nowhere in Alabama. 29
After 19 58, George Wallace reinvented himself
politically. He came Lo understand that white
Alabamans were more interested in rhetorical stands
than in what they could realistically achieve. 30 As
Wallace told his friends, John Patterson "out niggahed
me, and boys, I'm not going to be out-niggahed
again!" 31 Though he could not stop desegregation he
knew what his white constituency wanted to hear. 32
After 19 58, he devoted his efforts to increasing his
popularity by changing his rhetoric on civil rights. 33
The man who had been known as the "handshakingest candidate" in 1958 combined these "people
skills" with his new rhetoric, making him unbeatable
in Alabama. 34
Defense of racial purity was not purely symbolic; it
lay at the heart of Southern defiance .35 When he ran
for governor in 1962, Wallace feared another humiliating defeat but then he had a revelation; at first "I
couldn't make them listen, then I began talking about
niggers and they stomped Lhe fluor." 36 Increasing
pressure for desegregation led many Southerners Lo
28

Ibid ., 38.
Ibid., 38.
3
° Carter, "From Foster Auditorium," 69.
31
Ibid.
2
'
Frady, 96.
33
Carter, "P'rom Fosler Auditorium," 64.
34
Carroll, 25.
1
· ' Carroll, 25 .
36
Carroll, 40 -41.
29
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view lheir region as under siege. Wallace seized lhe
opportunity to capitalize on lhat insecurily. He would,
he promised, defend segregalion to the end. 37 In 1962,
the University of Mississippi at Oxford was under
court order to desegregale. When African-American
James Meredilh applied for enlrance, Mississippi
Governor Ross Barnett proclaimed that "No school will
be integrated in Mississippi while I am governor," he
declared.
"[Sjtand up like men and tell them
38
NEVER!"
Barnett's incendiary speech led to white
mobs' rioting at "Ole Miss" the day Meredith enrolled;
the resulting violence left lwo dead and 106 injured. 3 9
Nevertheless, Meredith did enroll and Barnetl had
made himself a Southern legend. The drama al Ole
Miss had changed the "segregation piclure," as the
New York Times commenled, and the "south [wouldjn't
be the same," nor would George Wallace. 40
Kennedy before Tuscaloosa
Raised a well-to-do Boslonian in a society where
blacks served mainly as maids and chauffeurs, Robert
Kennedy gave little thought lo civil rights and had no
feeling for lhe plighl of Africa11 Americans in lhe Soulh.
Even Schlesinger admilled lhal Kennedy only lruly
began to "think intensively about the problem" once he
had entered public offlce. 4 1 "I won't say I stayed awake
nights worrying about civil rights before I became
37

Carter, "From Foster's Auditorium ," 65.
Ibid.
39
Stephan Lesher, George IVal/ac: e: A111eric:a11 /Jopulist
( Readin g: Addison-We s le y Publishing Company, 1994 ), 166.
4
° Charles Silton. "Meredith Case Changes Segregation
Picture," New Yor/c Times, January J 4, 1963, p. 12.
41
Schlesinger, 287.
38

Published by Scholar Commons, 2008

9

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

al Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 13 [2008

80

Historical Perspectives

March 2008

Attorney General," Kennedy confessed. 42 Appointed as
attorney general by his brother, Robert approached his
new office with a distinct sense of self-importance and
a determination to dispel doubts about his qualifications. The equality of African Americans did not yet
figure in his moral universe, based initially on his
sense of obligation to his family and church. 43 All the
same, for someone so unconcerned with race issues,
Kennedy made some surprisingly strong statements iri
his first address as attorney general in May, 1961.
Regarding court ordered desegregation, he warned "if
the orders are circumvented .. . [the federal government]
will not stand by and be aloof. We will move." At the
same time, he called for "amicable, voluntary solutions
without going to court." 44 The response to this speech
surprised Kennedy and helped shape his views on civil
rights; rather than jeering, the University of Georgia
crowd applauded him for addressing race issues and
promising action. 45 Yet, it did not go unnoticed that
Robert Kennedy "refused to match his eloquent
speeches with deeds." 46 Martin Luther King and other
civil rights leaders criticized both brothers for not
moving fast enough. Civil rights had been a key part of
JFK's campaign oratory, and he had received the
endorsement o~ many civil rights groups. 47 Two years
42

Ibid., 286.
James W. Hilty, Robert Kennedy: Brothe r Protector
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1997), 2 19.
44
Theodore C. Sorensen, The Kennedy Legacy (New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1969), 221.
45
Sch lesinger, 293 .
46
Victor Lasky, Robert F. Kennedy: The Man and the Myth
(New York: Tridenl, 1968), 39G.
47
Navasky, 132.
43
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of inactivit y on race issues after such prom1sm g
campaig n rhetoric led many lo view the Kennedy s as
a disappoi ntment, and the "disastro us" handling of Ole
Miss, the attorney general acknowl edged, resulted in
48
the country placing blame "particu larly on me."
Setting the Stage
In January 1962, Robert Kennedy told the House
Appropr iations Commit tee that he felt "very strongly
that [the segregat ion] problem is not going to be solved
by just passing some laws. It will require some understanding. "49 The Kennedy adminis tration had viewed
former Presiden t Dwight Eisenho wer's use of troops at
Little Rock's Central High School as one of his greatest
policy failures, and yet governm ent restrain t had
50
Success with George
clearly failed at Ole Miss.
Wallace in Alabama was, therefore , even more
crucial. 51 Hoping to underst and the Souther n outlook
better, both brothers opened lines of commun ication
48
Robert Kennedy, "Interview with Anthony Lewis (with
Burke Marshall Present)," interview by Anthony Lewis,
December 1964, in Robert Kennedy: in His Own Words, The
Unpublish ed Recolleclio ns of the Kennedy Years, eds. Edwin 0.
Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1988),
165.
49
Mark Stern. "President ial Decision-M aking in Two
Desegrega tion Crises: Lillie Rock Central High School and the
University of Mississipp i. " Jn Presidenti al Leadershi p and Civil
rights Policy, eds. Donald W. Jackson and James W.
Riddlespe rger Jr. (Westport: Greenwoo d Press; 1995), 96.
50
Schlesing er, 325.
51
Nicholas Katzenbac h. "Origins of Kennedy's Civil rights."
Jn Portraits of America1t Presicle1tts Volume N: The Kennedy
Presidency : Seven Intimate Perspectiv es of John F. Kennedy, ed.
Kenneth W. Thompson (Lanham: University Press of America,
1985), 52.
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with the Alabama governor. A 1963 study found that
56 percent of white students at the University of
Alabama would be willing lo attend classes with black
students. 52 Yet, in a phone call on April 23, 1963 with
the attorney general, George Wallace insisted that
"there is no time in my judgment when we will be
ready for it [desegregation] -in my lifetime at least"
because "you just can't have any peace in Alabama
with an integrated school system." 53 Politics dictated
this statement; the governor had promised to challenge
John Kennedy's re-election plans on racial grounds.
"I'm gonna make race the basis of politics in this state,
and .. .in this country," he declared. For his own political survival he had to appear to keep his word. 54
Over the phone, the two men found no negotiating
space. Two days later, the attorney general arrived in
Montgomery for direct discussions with the governor.
Kennedy wanted to make clear that the federal government wanted no repeat of the Ole Miss disaster. 55
Both sides recognized that confrontation had become
inevitable because Wallace had focused the event
around his political career. Because Wallace had
promised to stand in the "schoolhouse door," his
reputation was on the line and he would be there come
hell or high water. As early as January 1963, New Yorlc
Times reported that the "showdown" between Wallace
52

Walter G. Stephan. "School De segregation: Short Term
and Long Term l!:ffects." In Opening Doors: Perspectives on Race
Relations in Contemporary America, eels. Robert J. Norrell and
Ronald W. Rogers (Tuscaloosa: Unive rsity of Alabama Press,
199l), 112.
53
Ibid., 100 .
54
Carroll, 42.
55
Ibid., 181.
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and the federal government was "expected" to occur
"sometime this year." 56 The attorney general insisted
that the law would prevail in Tuscaloosa, and hoped he
could reason with the governor. Should events come to
a head in Tuscaloosa, moreover, public efforts to
persuade Wallace to comply with the law would allow
the administration to claim that they had done everything possible to prevent violence.
Before arriving in Montgomery, Kennedy complimented the state of Alabama, its people and its leaders, asserting publicly-contrary Lu Lhe federal government's actual belief- that locals could handle the
situation. Although such flattery did not sway Wallace,
it did help Kennedy gain leverage with the American
public, including some white Alabamans. When he
arrived at the capital, hundreds of white Alabamans
greeted him, many with smiles and handshakes. 5 7 At
the same time, Wallace had his own game to play. To
make sure that Kennedy did not get too comfortable,
he arranged for 200 Alabama state troopers to meet
him at the capital. Kennedy understood Wallace's
intended warning: "The point was to try to show that
my life [Kennedy's] was in clanger. .. because these
people hated me so much." 58 From that point on every
action taken, every word spoken carried a political
message. The political drama had begun. America had
seen a brave attorney general enter hostile territory
through a mass of troops to negotiate with a Southern
governor for the civil rights of "negroes." For both
protagonists that image was worth a thousand words.
56

Charles Sillon, 12.

s, Schlesinge r, 18 2.
58

lbi<l, 338.
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Kennedy understood the need to appeal to whites
in Alabama to prevent violence in Tuscaloosa. This was
particularly crucial for Robert Kennedy because his
political reputation as the administration's voice on
civil rights and perhaps even his political career were
at stake. Wallace and Kennedy had few discussions,
and the attorney general chose his words carefully as
their conversations were tape recorded. 5 9 Though
neither intended to back down ahead of a public
confrontation, both understood that they could not
afford a fiasco like Ole Miss. 'l'hey also recognized that
if this event went "right," and each played his part as
expected, both would reap benefits . Contrary to his
public statements, Wallace did not want to prevent
desegregation, nor did he believe that he could. Although he wished to appear to defend white
Alabamans'interests, victory in Tuscaloosa would have
labeled Wallace an irredeemable racist to the larger
American public, destroying the possibility of any
political career outside of Alabama. Wallace wanted
political invincibility in Alabama, but he also hoped to
move beyond his state into national politics. The
governor miscalculated; the "stench" did not wash
away, and his words and stand proved indelible.
The conversation that took place on April 25, 1963
in the governor's mansion had not been of the governor's choosing. He did not want to appear to have cut
a deal with the federal government and feared Kennedy
might leak information about their talks to the public
59

I
I
I
I

I
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I
I
I
I

Heymann, 289.
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lo make him look bacl. 60 Wallace, therefore, warned
that he would tape their conversation. Kennedy
consented. 61 "It was necessary, then, for both of us to
say things to each other on the basis that it was going
lo be played on the local radio station," recalled
Kennedy. "At least for me, I couldn't let anything he't.l
say go by as if it had been unanswered." Forced into a
situation where vague answers might be misinterpreted, the attorney general knew that he had to
match each of Wallace's statements with one of his
own. Kennedy put Wallace on the defensive by asking
if the governor really thought it so "horrifying" to have
"Negroes" at the University of Alabama. Wallace
responded by defending states' rights. When Kennedy
reiterated that the federal government intended to
uphold the Constitution, not violate it, Wallace asserted that, on behalfofAlabama, he would not submit
to these "forces of tyranny." The whole matter, the
governor continued, would end up in the courts, since
neither man was going to back down. Kennedy replied
that it was fine if the matter wound up in the courts:
"I just don't want it to get into the streets. l don't want
to have another Oxford." 62
Kennedy wanted Lo avoid another Oxford in large
part because it would reflect poorly on both him and
his brother. With John running for reelection and
Robert having presidential aspirations, they could ill
afford a repeat performance in Tuscaloosa. Yet, lo say
that on tape was hardly possible. He could state that
60
E. Culpepper Clark, The Schoolhouse Door: Segregalion's
Lasl Sla1td al lhe U1tiversily of Alabama (Ox.ford: Oxford

U11ive rsily Press, 1993 ), 181 .
61
Schlesinge r, 338.
62
Ibid.
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I

he did not want another Oxford without clarifying why,
leaving the interpretation of his words up to the public.
The public could assume that he had moral reasons
for avoiding another Oxford. Kennedy had played the
game of rhetorical manipulation just as well as
Wallace. "I don't want another Mississippi myself,"
Wallace retorted, "but you folks are the ones that will
control that matter-because you have control of the
troops." 6 3 Did Kennedy fall into Wallace's trap at this
point in the conversation, by responding that the
government would use "all the force behind [itj" to
ensure that court orders were followed? 64 His warning
did play nicely into Wallace's reference to "tyrannical
forces of government," but Kennedy recovered the
moral high-ground quickly, by saying that he was
"planning and hoping that the law [would] be obeyed."
"[M]aybe somebody wants us to use the troops," he
continued, "but we are not anxious to." The attorney
general recognized how scripted Wallace had made
their encounter. Wallace "didn't fear defeat as a
political pitfall," since that outcome was inevitable. 65
But like Kennedy, Wallace had to emerge from this
conversation with his political image untarnished.
The two made no progress toward a negotiated
settlement. Wallace intended to stand in the school
house door. Speal<:ing three weeks after his brother's
meeting with the governor, President Kennedy did not
mince his words. "For one man to defy a law or court
order he does not like, is to invite others to
defy .. .leading to a breakdown of all justice and order."
63
64

65
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But this time, he went further in his denunciations
than either brother had so far. To "subject other
human beings to acts that are less than human,"
Kennedy said, "degrades his heritage." 66 This speech
was critical for the Kennedy administration. The
President transformed segregation into a moral problem. Casting Wallace as immoral, he gave his brother
the opportunity to appear the champion of a righteous
cause . The President's words also appealed to Southerners' own sense of pride in their heritage and culture. In so doing, he depicted Wallace, not Alabamans
in general, as responsible for this action.
On June 5, 1963 lhe governor was placed under
court order not lo block the two students from entering the university. Wallace appeared on television that
evening to reassure his constituency that he intended
to defy the order. "I will not let you down in this matter
of standing for you," he promised .67 No one, including
the governor, wanted Wallace lo be arrested in contempt of court, but he needed to dramatize his dedication to the cause. 6 8 Those close to him later noted that
initially the governor had not meant his promise to
"stand in the schoolhouse door" literally but that he
now felt obligated to "play out this act of defiance." 6 9
He shared the federal government's fear of violence and
asked Alabamans to stay away from the campus;
violence by groups like the White Citizen's Council of
Tuscaloosa County posed a significant threat. As a
66
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precaution Wallace activated the National Guard to
maintain order, not to block the entrance of Hood and
Malone. 70
National attention shifted to the theatrical event
underway in Alabama. 7 1 No one really knew what
Wallace intended to do. Some reports pictured him
acting like a mad man. 72 The Kennedys had no reassuring contact with the governor by then. 73 As the
attorney general put it, "the great question for us was
not having to arrest the governor ... [or] charge him
with contempt, and not having to send troops
into ... Alabama-and yet getting the students [in] ." 74
Yet Katzenbach stated, "I think we should let Wallace
have his show," and Robert Kennedy agreed. 75 Appeasing Wallace would, they hoped, ensure that he
would not initiate violence. Yet the stand-off was not
aired on national television merely to appease Wallace .
The show could serve both sides. The attorney general
hoped to diminish Wallace before a national public
while making the Kennedy adn1inistration appear as a
champion for civil rights. Kennedy told Katzenbach to
"dismiss George Wallace as a sort of second rate figure,
wasting ... [everyone's] time, ca.using a great fuss down
there." 7 6
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Showtime
On June 11, Katzenbach met Wallace at the door of
Foster Auditorium, lea ving Hood and Malone in the
car. If Wallace blocked his entry, he would not be in
contempt of court because it would only be
Katzenbach whom he blocked, not the studenls. As
Katzenbach crossed the space between his car and the
door, journalists fell silent and the nation watched. A
profusely sweating, rumpled representative of the
federal government arrived at the doorway to find
Governor Wallace standing on the painted mark he
had requested to position himself in front of the door
for maximum camera exposure. Immediately before
that, Wallace had been pacing in an air-conditioned
room, so he looked markedly more composed than
Katzenbach. Wallace threw up his hands to block
Katzenbach, and th e two exchanged a few irritated
phrases, then Katzenbach, his face clearly showing
annoyance, turned away, arms crossed over his chest,
and disappeared into his car. 77
When Katzenbach reappeared a few hours later, the
scenario changed. Wallace had sent word that when
Katzenbach returned he intended to say a few words
and then step aside , letting the inevitable take place.
Wallace stuck to his script. The second meeting of the
two men, entirely staged for the benefit of the TV
cameras, captured the meaning of the day's events for
a national audience. Within two hours, the "stand in
the schoolhouse door" had ended without incident;
Wallace stepped aside and the two students registered
without interference from Wallace, the Klan or anyone
77
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else. 78 Vivian Malone later reflected, "I didn't feel I
should sneak in, I didn't feel I should go around the
back door. If [Wallace] were standing [in] the door, I
had every right in the world t o face him and to go to
school," and that she did. Two years later Malone
became the first African American to graduate from the
University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa. 79 Wallace later
apologized to the white people of Alabama melodramatically: "I can't fight bayonets with my bare hands." 80
Wallace had provided the Kennedy administration
with a perfect opening for the President's speech
declaring civil rights a moral issue. 81 Robert Kennedy
also capitalized on the success at Tuscaloosa in his
public speech on June 21. The attorney general urged
citizens to re-read the Constitution to discover the
moral principles that inspired the court and the
Kennedy administration's stand on civil rights. 8 2 The
headlines for the next several weeks in the national
media presented the attorney general as a civil rights
activist. The Washington Posfs headline for June 24
read "Rights Moral Issues, R.F. Kennedy Says." The
subhead for a New York Times' July 1 article on the
President's new civil rights legislation read "Robert
Kennedy to Lead off in Administration's Battle for New
78
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Legislation." He appeared on the cover of Time Magazine on June 21 under the headline "Civil Rights: A
Moral Crisis," followed by a quote from the attorney
general: "It is time to act in all of our daily lives." 83 In
the wake of this media onslaught, Kennedy emerged a
champion of social justice, all the more so given the
kind of coverage that George Wallace received.
Wallace received no sympathy in national media
coverage. The day after the stand, The New York Times
headline showed Wallace a defeated man; "Governor
Leaves" was really all the headline he deserved. 84
National disgust with Wallace placed the blame for
"The Great Sham Battle of Tuscaloosa," as the Times
dubbed it, squarely on Wallace's shoulders. 85 The
"show" put on for America's benefit was tainted by the
now public recognition that it had been a scripted
battle in a political game. And yet, white Alabamans
justified the Governor's actions as a defense of their
southern traditions. Alabaman Daisy Segal said, "the
great majority of [Alabamans] appreciate the stand
Governor Wallace has taken and are proud that [he
had] the intestinal fortitude to stand up and say no."
J\licc Starr agreed: "Cheers for George Wallace ... an
upright and courageous man ... fighting for the things
83
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(accessed online 9 March 2007) <http://www.time .com/li.me/
covers/0, 16641, 19630621,00.hlml>
84
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we believe in." 86
For the next several weeks the media's coverage of
the event swelled. Three months later, on September
15, 1963 when the 16 th Street Baptist Church in
Birmingham, Alabama blew up as a result of a Klan
bombing, killing four young black girls inside, Alabama's governor earned the cover of Time Magazine as
if he were responsible. A rather nasty looking Wallace
was juxtaposed with a picture of a stained glass
window in the church that had remarkably remained
intact after the bombing, with the exception of Jesus
Christ's face, which had blown out. The headline read
"Alabama: Civil Rights Battlefield ."87 The symbolism of
the broken window made many Americans shake their
heads in amazement, and Wallace's picture underneath it added a whole new religious element to its
meaning. Wallace had entered an immoral battle, and
his actions were besmirching tbe face of Christ. Who
would not hate him after seeing that?
Wallace's stand, which he hoped would make him
nothing short of legendary in the South, came to
appear in a very different light. "Standing in almost
pitiable solitude against Bobby's forces," as Time
Magazine described him, Wallace looked "visibly pale
and trembly." Kennedy who had "rolled up his sleeves
and turned his office into a command post" was ready
to rumble. Though the reporter acknowledged that
many later suspected the Tuscaloosa incident had
86
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been a charade, it did not seem to maller because the
attorney general's tactics "had worked." Most importantly of all, the nation was convinced that "Jack and
Bobby Kennedy both genuinely believe in equal
rights." 88
Gentlemen, Take Your Bows
Race issues in the United States were finally on the
top of everyone's agenda, and Wallace, as he had
hoped, was at the center of it all. But by focusing
national attention on race with himself in the starring
role, Wallace became a notorious racist. Wallace
needed to undertake some serious damage control
when he ran for the presidency in 1964 and then again
in the next three successive elections. He insisted that
he had never had a racist agenda but rather intended
his actions at Tuscaloosa to serve as a "dramatic way
to impress upon the American people this omnipotent
march of centralized government that is going to
destroy the rights ... of the people." 89 He had not sought
martyrdom or personal glory. He tried lo dismiss his
infamous statement, "Segregation now! Segregation
tomorrow! Segregation forever!" by saying that what he
should have said was "Stales' rights now! Slates' rights
tomorrow! States' rights forever!" 90 He had never been
against black people; his words and actions had
nothing to do with race he insisted. Dan Carter argues
that nothing was further from the truth. Wallace was
unquestionably a racist yet it is also true that his
88
"The Long March" Time Magazine, Seplernber 27, 1963
vol. 82. no. 13, l. (accessed online 9 March 2007)
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stand at Tuscaloosa was less about race than about
himself. Later Wallace realized that making the history
books as a moral monster was not going to bring him
the political success he wanted.
In 1996, an ailing George Wallace apologized to
Vivian Malone for making his stand. He commended
Malone for conducting herself with such "grace,
strength, and, above all, courage" and presented
Malone, rather ironically, with the Lurleen B. Wallace
Award for Courage, named after the Governor's first
wife. Malone toid the former Governor that she had
long since forgiven him. Only Wallace knew for sure if
his transformation, from "racial bigot to friend of
African Americans" was sincere; however, "history will
undoubtedly remember the hard-core segregationist
George Wallace of 1963 and not the repentant dying
ex-Governor of 1996."91 Today the character of George
Wallace, villainous Governor of Alabama, is a mainstay
not just in Dixie's wax museum; it also haunts the
national memory of a lost Kennedy. Wallace never
successfully repaired his image because he needed to
remain the "bad guy" for Kennedy to remain the "good
guy" in American history . The nation's fascination with
the stand and the characters that history has created
of the two men has perhaps resulted in the erasure of
the real significance of that day. On the fortieth
anniversary of the desegregation Vivian Malone commented that "what I was hoping and what I'm [still]
hoping will happen ... is that we celebrate the opening
of the door, not the stand, not the attempt to close the
91
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door." 92 Malone's hope has not yet come to fruition.
Wallace had turned the nation's attention to
important social issues of lhe times, but his uncompromising defense of them had sealed not only his own
fate but Kennedy's as well. The attorney general never
took personal credit for lhe clefeal of Wallace and even
less for the defeat ofracism in the South, but he never
corrected anyone who did give him such credit. Because Kennedy did not have to defend his actions in
Tuscaloosa, he also did not have to clarify his intentions behind them. Any more truthful retrospective
could only burnish the shine.
Assassins tried to kill both Kennedy and Wallace in
the years following Tuscaloosa, and succeeded in the
case of Kennedy in 1968. 93 On May 15, 1972, Wallace
was speaking in Laurel, Maryland, as part of his third
presidential campaign, when he was shot by a wouldbe assassin. Wallace survived lhe assassination
attempt but would be permanently paralyzed. 94 None
92
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Lesher, 48-481. A restless and boisterous crowd contained
hecklers chanting "Hitler for Vice President" and "bullshit,
bullshit" and throwing rocks, coins, tomatoes and other debris
at the lectern. Arthur Bremer, a twenty-year-old man wearing a
Wallace button on his coat lapel and cheering loudly for the
governor was so enthusiastic that television newsman Fred
Farrar instructed his cameraman to film him because "this guy
is weird. That smirk of his is almost spine-tingling." When
Wallace's caravan proceeded to the Laurel Shopping Center for
another speaking engagement, Bremer followed. After this
speech, Wallace approached Bremer lo shake his hand, and
Bremer shot the governor five times.
94
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of Wallace's campaigns for Presidency were successful
because his attempts at revamping his image had
failed. 95 Wallace had played the part of villain too well
and was unable to wash tha t racist "stench" away.
Robert Kennedy was killed on June 5, 1968 on the
evening of the California primary while running for
President. 96
The double assassination of Martin
Luther King and Kennedy in such a short period of
time (King was assassinated on April 4, 1968) grieved
the nation, especially the African American community. SNCC member John Lewis described their pain:
"First Dr. King then Bobby Ke nnedy .. .what could we
believe in now? How much more could we take?" 9 7
The assassination of Kennedy, like the attempted
assassination of Wallace, was featured on magazine
covers nationwide . Life Magazine perhaps encapsulated the nalion's sentiments best with its images . The
issue after Kennedy's death featured an image of
Kennedy alive and well , jogging on a beach with his
dog, the only words on the cover saying "Senator
Robert F. Kennedy." 98 The May 26, 1972 issue following Wallace's shooting featured a picture of the slain
Governor, bleeding and embraced by his wife with the
words, "The Wallace Shootin g" in large bold text,
95
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nothing indicaling thal the Governor had survived. 99
This was lhe way America wan led lo remember lhe two
men: Kennedy alive and well, making progress, on the
move; Wallace, wounded and defeated. Tuscaloosa had
set these images in place.
99
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